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Abstract 
Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners 
accept rather than believe religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on 
religious sentences. I develop an alternative to religious fictionalism, which I call “religious 
practicalism.” It holds that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that 
religious practitioners believe rather than merely accept religious sentences, and that it is 
justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I argue that religious practicalism has 
intellectual, moral, and practical advantages over religious fictionalism. 
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1. Introduction 
Fictionalism can be found in several fields of philosophy, such as the philosophy of 
mathematics, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of religion. Mathematical fictionalism holds 
that mathematical discourse is a fiction, so “mathematical theories are not true” (Balaguer, 
2018). Moral fictionalism holds that moral discourse is a fiction, so “moral assertions are 
typically untrue” (Joyce, 2005: 287). Religious fictionalism holds that religious discourse is a 
fiction, so religious sentences are false. It also claims that religious practitioners1 accept, but 
do not believe, religious sentences, and it is legitimate for them to act on religious sentences. 
Religious fictionalism has advantages and disadvantages, as two survey articles (Scott, 
2017; Scott and Malcolm, 2018) note. This paper aims to expose five new disadvantages of it 
and to defend an alternative account of religious discourse, which I call “religious 
practicalism.” It holds that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that 
religious practitioners believe rather than merely accept religious sentences, and that it is 
justifiable for them to act on religious sentences.  
The outline of the present paper is as follows. I spell out religious fictionalism and 
display two advantages of it in Section 2. In Section 3, I unfold five new disadvantages of it. 
In Section 4, I enunciate religious practicalism and display the five advantages of it over 
religious fictionalism. In Section 5, I reply to a possible objection that religious practicalism 
depicts religious practitioners as being dogmatic, and then respond to religious fictionalists’ 
possible new position that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false.  
This paper should be of interest to those who wonder what we ought to make of 
religious sentences and practitioners, i.e., whether we can attribute false religious beliefs to 
religious practitioners, whether religious practitioners believe religious sentences, and 
whether it is justifiable for them to behave as if religious sentences are true. This paper does 
not concern how we should interpret metaphors and allegories in religious language. Readers 
interested in this topic are referred to Michael Sell (1994) and Denys Turner (1998). 
 
 
1 In this paper, religious practitioners are those who act on religious sentences. It is under dispute between 
religious fictionalists and practicalists whether they accept or believe religious sentences. 
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2. Religious Fictionalism 
Religious fictionalism is composed of the following three theses: (i) Religious sentences are 
false. (ii) Religious practitioners accept rather than believe religious sentences. In other 
words, religious practitioners “accept but do not believe what they say when engaging in 
religious discourse” (Scott, 2017). (iii) It is justifiable for religious practitioners to act on 
religious sentences. To put it another way, “it is morally and intellectually legitimate to 
affirm religious sentences without believing the content of what is said” (Scott and Malcolm, 
2018: 1). The first thesis is clear, whereas the second and third theses are not. Let me clarify 
the two opaque theses one by one. 
When religious fictionalists contend that religious practitioners accept rather than 
believe religious sentences, they have in mind Jonathan Cohen’s (1992) conceptions of belief 
and acceptance. According to Cohen, to believe a proposition is to feel that it is true, but to 
accept it is to commit to use it “for deciding what to do or think in a particular context” 
(Cohen, 1992: 4). Consider, for example, the proposition that a defendant is not guilty. On 
Cohen’s account, a lawyer can accept it, and that as a result, she can behave in court as if it is 
true, although she does not believe it. In short, she can pretend to believe that her defendant is 
not guilty. There is no behavioral difference between accepters and believers of a proposition. 
There is only a mental difference between them, viz., believers feel, whereas acceptors do 
not, that the proposition is true. 
On the religious fictionalist account, just as the lawyer only need to accept that her 
defendant is not guilty to behave as if her defendant is not guilty, so religious practitioners 
only need to accept religious sentences to behave as if religious sentences are true. In other 
words, the belief that God exists is not required for religious practitioners to behave as if 
religious sentences are true any more than the belief that the defendant is not guilty is 
required for the lawyer to behave in court as if the defendant is not guilty.  
Recall that the third thesis of religious fictionalism states that “it is morally and 
intellectually legitimate to affirm religious sentences without believing the content of what is 
said” (Scott and Malcolm, 2018: 1). In other words, it is legitimate for religious practitioners 
to behave as if religious sentences are true, even though they do not believe them. Consider, 
for example, the religious sentence, “God loves us.” Religious fictionalists maintain that this 
sentence is false, but that it is intellectually and morally legitimate for religious practitioners 
to act on it. After all, they can enjoy practical benefits from behaving as if it is true. The 
practical benefits include strengthening social bonds within religious groups and possibly 
going to heaven. 
What motivates religious fictionalism? There is no convincing argument for religious 
beliefs, but there are strong objections, such as the problem of evil, to religious beliefs. 
Hence, religious beliefs are false. Yet, philosophers of religion can avoid attributing false 
beliefs to religious practitioners, if they embrace religious fictionalism according to which 
religious practitioners accept rather than believe religious sentences. We ought not to 
attribute false beliefs to our target agents, ceteris paribus. Moreover, philosophers of religion 
can avoid attributing immorality and intellectual irrationality to religious practitioners. Other 
things being equal, we ought not to attribute such negative properties to our target agents.  
 
3. Criticisms 
3.1. Pascal’s Wager 
This subsection explores how Pascalians would respond to religious fictionalism. I argue that 
they would reject it on the grounds that it precludes the possibility that believers go to 
heaven.  
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Pascal’s Wager holds that there is no strong argument for the existence of God, but that 
we should believe in him because it is possible that he rewards believers with eternal bliss in 
heaven. Some critics of Pascal’s Wager object that it is psychologically impossible to believe 
in him in the absence of a convincing argument for his existence. Pascal replies that we will 
acquire belief in God by engaging in religious discourse for a long time. This reply implies 
that acting as if religious sentences are true can be a means to arrive at belief in God, which 
in turn implies that pretending to believe in God is not enough, and that we should actually 
believe in God to go to heaven. In other words, what will take us to heaven is “belief in God, 
not mere pretence belief” (Olson, 2014: 192). 
Pascal’s Wager and religious fictionalism do not go hand in hand. According to 
Pascal’s Wager, it is belief in God, not acceptance in God, that will take religious 
practitioners to heaven, i.e., you have to feel that God exists to go to heaven. (Hermeneutic) 
religious fictionalism, however, asserts that religious practitioners do not believe religious 
sentences, which implies that they do not have a chance to go to heaven, even if heaven 
exists. Moreover, religious fictionalism asserts that religious sentences are false, so heaven 
does not exist. Consequently, we can conclude that religious fictionalism casts a damper on 
Pascalians’ aspirations for heaven. 
Recall that religious fictionalism has the advantage that philosophers of religion can 
avoid attributing false beliefs, immorality, and intellectual irrationality to religious 
practitioners. It turns out, however, that this advantage comes with the disadvantage of ruling 
out the possibility that religious practitioners go to heaven and the possibility that 
philosophers of religion depict religious practitioners as having the chance to go to heaven. 
Therefore, philosophers of religion should weigh the advantage and the disadvantage before 
embracing religious fictionalism.  
Religious fictionalists would object that Pascal’s Wager is contentious, hence I should 
justify it before appealing to it to undermine religious fictionalism. Admittedly, this request is 
reasonable. Complying with it, however, would lead us far afield, given that Pascal’s Wager 
is a huge topic in the philosophy of religion. Suffice it to say here that this paper assumes, 
along with Pascal’s Wager, that it is practically rational to believe in God as long as there is a 
non-zero probability that God sends believers to heaven, and that it is not an easy task to 
prove that the probability is zero.  
 
3.2. Dilemma 
Let me construct a dilemma against religious fictionalists. As we saw in Section 2, they 
contend that religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences. How about 
nonreligious sentences? Do they also merely accept nonreligious sentences? Religious 
fictionalists can either say that religious practitioners merely accept nonreligious sentences, 
or that religious practitioners believe nonreligious sentences. Both answers are problematic. 
On the one hand, if religious fictionalists say that religious practitioners merely accept 
nonreligious sentences, they are implying that religious practitioners merely accept even 
sentences like “I exist.” But how can they merely accept that they exist? How can they not 
feel that they exist? In my view, their existence is so clear to them that they cannot help 
believing that they exist, and that they cannot merely accept that they exist. Moreover, the 
fact that they accept that they exist shows that they exist. They are committing a 
contradiction when they say that they do not exist, but that they merely accept that they exist. 
Therefore, religious fictionalists have no choice but to say that religious practicalists believe 
that they exist. 
On the other hand, if religious fictionalists say that religious practitioners believe 
nonreligious sentences, religious fictionalists have the burden of explicating the relevant 
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difference between religious and nonreligious sentences that entitles them to say that 
religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences but believe nonreligious sentences. 
For example, what is the relevant difference between “God exists” and “I am smarter than 
average”? Moreover, there are tricky sentences, such as “Don’t commit adultery” and 
“Respect your parents.” Are these sentences religious or nonreligious? The existence of such 
sentences shows that it is a challenging task to draw a line between religious and nonreligious 
sentences. 
In sum, religious fictionalists have either the burden of explaining how religious 
practitioners can even not feel that they exist, i.e., how religious practitioners can even not 
believe that they exist, or the burden of explicating the relevant difference between religious 
and nonreligious sentences that would entitle them to say that religious practitioners accept 
the former and believe the latter, and the burden of drawing a line between religious and 
nonreligious sentences. 
 
3.3. Intellectually and Morally Legitimate? 
Recall that according to religious fictionalism, “it is morally and intellectually legitimate to 
affirm religious sentences without believing the content of what is said” (Scott and Malcolm, 
2018: 1). In other words, it is justifiable merely to accept religious sentences and then to act 
on them. I dispute this normative claim in this subsection. 
When we speak what we do not believe, the following four problems arise. The first 
one is Moore’s paradox. It occurs whenever we speak a sentence of the structure, “P, but I 
don’t believe p” or “P, but I believe not p” (Moore, 1993: 207–212). An example is “Water is 
H2O, but I don’t believe water is H2O.” Suppose that scientific antirealists say, “Spacetime 
shrank and expanded here a minute ago because two black holes were combined in a distance 
region of space a billion years ago,” to explain why spacetime shrank and expanded in a 
certain place, but they add, “But I don’t believe spacetime shrank and expanded here a 
minute ago because two black holes were combined in a distance region of space a billion 
years ago,” to let their audience know that they are antirealists. Scientific antirealists would 
be caught in Moore’s paradox, and what they say would puzzle their audience (Park, 2018a: 
33). This criticism against scientific antirealists applies no less to religious practitioners who 
merely accept religious sentences. Suppose that there are atheists, and that they speak as if 
they were religious practitioners. They accept the religious sentence, “God loves you,” and 
say to you, “God loves you.” You ask them whether they believe that God loves me. Since 
they are atheists, they would answer, “But I don’t believe God loves you.” As a result, they 
would be caught in Moore’s paradox, and what they say would puzzle you.  
The second problem is the problem of disconcerting questions. Suppose that scientific 
antirealists, who disbelieve scientific theories, speak as if scientific theories are true. Despite 
disbelieving general relativity, for instance, they say, “Spacetime shrank and expanded here a 
minute ago because two black holes were combined in a distance region of space a billion 
years ago.” Their audience might ask them the following disconcerting questions: “Do you 
believe what you just said? If you don’t, why should I believe what you don’t? How can you 
say to me what you don’t believe? Do you expect me to believe what you don’t?” (Park, 
2019a: 155). This criticism against scientific antirealists applies no less to religious 
practitioners who merely accept religious sentences but speak as if they believe religious 
sentences. Suppose that they say to you, “God loves you.” You can ask the disconcerting 
questions to them. 
The third problem is the problem of deceptive speech acts. When we speak sentences 
that we do not believe, we are pretending to believe them, and hence our speech acts are 
deceptive to our audience. Why are deceptive speech acts immoral? 
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Imagine, for example, that there is a successful televangelist. He persuaded millions of 
television viewers into Christianity. It later turns out, however, that he is a thorough atheist. He 
just spoke as if he were a theist. He said, for example, “God loves you,” although he did not 
believe that God exists. His speech acts did not match up with doxastic states! In such 
circumstances, the converted would feel that they were deceived, and that his speech acts were 
unethical. (Park, 2014: 432) 
 
The televangelist cannot escape from the moral blame by saying that he accepted religious 
sentences for the purpose of doing his job. The fact that he accepted religious sentences only 
shows that religious fictionalists owe us an account of when it is permissible and 
impermissible to accept religious sentences. 
The fourth problem might be called “the problem of mistrust.” If you merely accept 
certain sentences, your epistemic colleagues might lose trust in you, and as a result, they 
might no longer believe what you say (Park, 2018a: 36). If your epistemic colleagues do not 
believe what you say, you might suffer from epistemic and pragmatic disadvantages (Park, 
2019b: 97). For example, you cannot propagate your positive theories to your epistemic 
colleagues, and they might refuse to grant you scholarly awards for your positive theories on 
the grounds that they do not believe your positive theories. 
How do the four problems relate to religious fictionalism? Religious fictionalism 
claims that religious practitioners do not believe religious sentences, but they rather accept 
religious sentences. Therefore, we can conclude that religious fictionalism attributes the four 
problems to religious practitioners. Religious fictionalism also claims that it is intellectually 
and morally legitimate for religious practitioners to accept religious sentences and then to act 
on them. However, the four problems indicate that it is intellectually and morally illegitimate 
to do so. 
 
3.4. Better Epistemic Access? 
According to religious fictionalism, religious practitioners “accept but do not believe what 
they say when engaging in religious discourse” (Scott, 2017). Suppose, however, that 
religious practitioners protest that they feel that religious sentences are true. They insist that 
they believe religious sentences, just as they believe nonreligious sentences like “Electrons 
exist” and “Snow is white.” They add that they do not merely accept religious sentences any 
more than they merely accept nonreligious sentences. Under such a condition, it is not clear 
what grounds religious fictionalists have for denying that religious practitioners believe 
religious sentences.  
Religious fictionalists do not have better epistemic access to religious practitioners’ 
mental states than the practitioners themselves do. A cognitive agent has better epistemic 
access to her own mental state than anyone else does (Goldman, 1993). For example, the 
hunger sensation that occurs in a cognitive agent’s mind is better known to her than to 
anyone else. This common knowledge in epistemology implies that religious practitioners 
know better about whether they believe or merely accept religious sentences than religious 
fictionalists do. 
In response to this criticism, religious fictionalists might jettison the descriptive thesis 
that religious practitioners accept, rather than believe, religious sentences, and then fall back 
on the normative thesis that religious practitioners should merely accept religious sentences. 
This normative thesis avoids the objection that religious practitioners have better epistemic 
access to their own mental states than religious fictionalists.  
The normative thesis, however, is also vulnerable to the objections introduced in 
Subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 above. To be specific: (i) If religious practitioners merely accept 
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religious sentences, they would not have the chance to go to heaven, as noted in Subsection 
3.1. Thus, religious fictionalists need to explain why religious practitioners should give up 
the chance to go to heaven. (ii) If religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences, 
they would have to explain how they can even not feel that they exist, or have to explicate the 
relevant difference between religious and nonreligious sentences that entitle them merely to 
accept religious sentences but to believe nonreligious sentences, as we have seen in 
Subsection 3.2. Hence, religious fictionalists have the burden of explaining why religious 
practitioners should put themselves in this dilemma. (iii) If religious practitioners merely 
accept a religious sentence, they would run into the four problems unpacked in Subsection 
3.3. Accordingly, religious fictionalists owe us an explanation of why religious practitioners 
should face those four problems.  
 
3.5. Epistemic Reciprocalism 
Let me introduce a position called “epistemic reciprocalism” in the philosophy of science 
literature. It holds that “we ought to treat our epistemic colleagues, as they treat their 
epistemic agents” (Park, 2017a: 57). Epistemic reciprocalists believe scientific realists’ 
positive philosophical theories on the grounds that scientific realists believe scientists’ 
theories. By contrast, epistemic reciprocalists disbelieve scientific antirealists’ positive 
philosophical theories on the grounds that scientific antirealists disbelieve scientists’ theories. 
What does epistemic reciprocalism have to do with the present topic? Religious 
practitioners, embracing epistemic reciprocalism, would treat religious fictionalists in the 
way religious fictionalists treat religious practitioners. Suppose, for example, that religious 
fictionalists say, “Religious sentences are false.” Religious practitioners would in turn assert 
that religious fictionalists do not believe this sentence, but rather merely accept it, and that 
since religious fictionalists do not believe it, religious practitioners would not believe it 
either. As a result, religious fictionalists would fail to propagate religious fictionalism to 
religious practitioners. 
Religious fictionalists might argue that they believe, rather than merely accept, the 
sentence “Religious sentences are false,” and thus religious practitioners are wrong to say 
that religious fictionalists merely accept it. Religious practitioners, however, would reply that 
it is a double standard for religious fictionalists to believe it while asserting that religious 
practitioners merely accept religious sentences. They would add that since religious 
fictionalists believe their own sentences, they should expect that their target agents also 
believe their own sentences, other things being equal. In short, religious practitioners would 
say that religious fictionalists should apply the same standard to themselves as to their target 
agents. 
Religious fictionalists might argue that religious practitioners should interpret them as 
believing the sentence, “Religious sentences are false.” Religious practitioners, however, 
would retort that if religious fictionalists want religious practitioners to interpret them as 
believing their sentences, religious fictionalists should also interpret religious practitioners as 
believing their sentences. It is a double standard for religious fictionalists to interpret 
religious practitioners as accepting their sentences, but to expect that religious practitioners 
would interpret them as believing their sentences.  
Religious fictionalists would defend their fictionalist attitude toward religious 
practitioners as follows. They just wish to avoid attributing false beliefs to religious 
practitioners, so they assert that religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences. 
However, religious practitioners would similarly defend their fictionalist attitude toward 
religious fictionalists. They would argue that they also just wish to avoid ascribing false 
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beliefs to religious fictionalists, so they assert that religious fictionalists merely accept the 
sentence “Religious sentences are false.”  
This confrontation between religious fictionalists and practitioners shows that if it is 
legitimate for religious fictionalists to take the fictionalist attitude toward religious 
practitioners’ language, it is also legitimate for religious practitioners to take the fictionalist 
attitude toward religious fictionalists’ language. In addition, the dialectic between them 
reminds us that “There is no reason for thinking that the Golden Rule ranges over moral 
matters, but not over epistemic matters” (Park, 2018b: 77–78). If religious fictionalists do not 
want their target agents to take the fictionalist attitude toward them, they should not take the 
fictionalist attitude toward their target agents. The dialectic also reminds us of the epistemic 
principle called “the epistemic imperative.” It says, “Act only on an epistemic maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal one” (Park, 2018c: 
441). Consider the maxim “Take the fictionalist attitude toward your target agents.” If 
religious fictionalists do not will it to become a universal maxim, they should not act on it 
themselves. 
 
4. Religious Practicalism 
The five disadvantages of religious fictionalism that I sketched in Section 3 motivate an 
alternative account of religious discourse that I call “religious practicalism.” I explicate it in 
this section. Religious practitioners would find it more agreeable than religious fictionalism. 
As mentioned in Section 1, religious practicalism is composed of the following three 
theses: (i) We do not know whether religious sentences are true or false. (ii) Religious 
practitioners believe religious sentences. For example, when religious practitioners say, “God 
loves us,” they believe that God loves us. (iii) Religious practitioners can justifiably carry on 
speaking religious sentences for practical benefits. The combination of these three theses is 
named as “religious practicalism” because it enshrines the idea that religious practitioners are 
practical agents pursuing happiness. 
There are two similarities between religious fictionalism and practicalism. First, both 
assert that religious practitioners can justifiably carry on speaking religious sentences for 
practical purposes. Second, neither attributes false religious beliefs to religious practitioners. 
They do not, however, for different reasons. Religious fictionalism does not do so on the 
grounds that we should not attribute false beliefs to religious practitioners, other things being 
equal. Religious practicalism does not do so on the grounds that we do not know whether 
religious sentences are true or false.  
There are two important differences between religious fictionalism and practicalism. 
First, religious fictionalism asserts that religious sentences are false, whereas religious 
practicalism asserts that we do not know whether they are true or false. Hence, religious 
fictionalism entails atheism, whereas religious practicalism entails skepticism. Second, 
religious fictionalism claims that religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences, 
whereas religious practicalism claims that religious practitioners believe religious sentences. 
As a result, religious practicalism fares better than religious fictionalism with respect to the 
five criticisms that I raised against religious fictionalism in Section 3. 
Let me summarize the five advantages of religious practicalism over religious 
fictionalism: (i) Religious practicalism leaves the possibility open that believers will go to 
heaven, whereas religious fictionalism leaves this possibility closed. For this reason, 
Pascalians would choose religious practicalism over religious fictionalism. (ii) Religious 
practicalism asserts that religious practitioners believe religious sentences, and thus religious 
practicalists are not in the dilemma that religious fictionalists are in. (See Subsection 3.2 for 
the dilemma.) (iii) According to religious practicalism, religious practitioners believe 
8 
religious sentences. Consequently, religious practicalism does not attribute the four problems 
to religious practitioners. (See Subsection 3.3 for the four problems.) (iv) Religious 
practicalism does not imply that philosophers of religion have better epistemic access to 
religious practitioners’ mental states than the practitioners themselves. (v) Religious 
practicalists comply with the epistemic imperative. Consider the maxim “Interpret your target 
agents as believing their sentences.” Religious practicalists act on it, and they will it to 
become a universal maxim.  
 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1. Dogmatic 
Opponents might argue that religious practicalism paints religious practitioners as being 
dogmatic. The first thesis of religious practicalism states that we do not know whether 
religious sentences are true or false. The second thesis states, however, that religious 
practitioners believe religious sentences. In general, if we do not know whether a sentence is 
true or false, we should not believe it, and we should instead withhold our judgment. Thus, 
religious practicalism implies that religious practitioners adhere to religious beliefs despite 
the lack of sufficient evidence for them. 
We, however, hold certain beliefs despite the lack of sufficient evidence for them all 
the time. For example, we tend to believe that we are smarter, look better, and drive better 
than average. We tend to overestimate the qualities of ourselves, i.e., we are under what 
psychologists call “illusory superiority.” Patricia Cross (1977) discovered an example of 
illusory superiority that might be a rude awakening to many readers of this paper, viz., 
professors tend to believe that their teaching abilities are above average. Many of their beliefs 
are false, but they hold them, and it is not irrational to hold them. After all, it is difficult to 
falsify them. If a professor provides evidence to show that another professor’s teaching 
ability is below average, the latter will certainly adduce counterevidence and/or take issue 
with the standard of the evaluation. As a result, the former will never be able to falsify the 
latter’s belief. Moreover, professors’ beliefs about their teaching abilities are useful in that 
they protect their self-esteem and help maintain their mental health. The same holds for 
religious beliefs. It is difficult to falsify them, and they are useful to religious practitioners. 
For these two reasons, religious practitioners will continue to hold them. Religious 
practicalism asserts that it is justifiable for them to do so. 
When professors say, “I teach better than average,” psychologists would say that we do 
not know whether professors’ sentence is true or false, and that professors believe it. 
Psychologists would not say that professors’ sentence is false, and that professors merely 
accept it. Like psychologists, philosophers of religion should say that we do not know 
whether religious practitioners’ sentences are true or false, and that religious practitioners 
believe their sentences. Philosophers of religion should not say that religious practitioners’ 
sentences are false, and that religious practitioners merely accept their sentences. 
Critics might object that there is a relevant difference between professors’ sentence and 
religious practitioner’s sentences, viz., there is no proof that professors’ sentence is false, but 
there is proof, viz., the problem of evil,2 that religious practitioners’ sentences are false. 
Therefore, psychologists can say that we do not know whether professors’ sentence is true or 
false, but philosophers of religion cannot say that we do not know whether religious 
practitioners’ sentences are true or false, i.e., they can only say that they are false. 
 
2 In addition to the problem of evil, there are the problems of divine location and age. They hold, respectively, 
that it is not clear where God existed before he created the universe and how old he was when he created the 
universe (Park, 2017b). 
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Religious practicalists admit that the problem of evil constitutes some reason for 
disbelieving that God exists, but they insist that it is not powerful enough to persuade 
believers that God does not exist. In general, the higher the stakes are, the more powerful an 
argument should be to disprove a belief. The stakes are extremely high when it comes to 
belief in God, given that religious practitioners might or might not go to heaven, depending 
on whether they have it or not. Thus, an extremely powerful argument is required to persuade 
believers that their belief is false. The problem of evil does not amount to such an argument. 
 
5.2. Potential Modification 
Religious fictionalists might modify their position. The old position holds that religious 
sentences are false, that religious practitioners merely accept religious sentences, and that 
they can justifiably behave as if religious sentences are true. The new position holds that we 
do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that religious practitioners merely 
accept religious sentences, and that they can justifiably behave as if religious sentences are 
true. Note that the new position claims, like religious practicalism, that we do not know 
whether religious sentences are true. From the Pascalians’ perspective, the new position 
seems to be advantageous over the old position in that it leaves the possibility open, while the 
latter leaves it closed, that they go to heaven. 
On a closer examination, however, the new position also implies that religious 
practitioners do not have the chance to go to heaven. Like the old position, the new position 
claims that religious practitioners do not believe, but rather merely accept, religious 
sentences. According to Pascal’s Wager, what will take us to heaven is “belief in God, not 
mere pretence belief” (Olson, 2014: 192). In other words, we should not only behave as if 
God exists but also believe in God to go to heaven. 
Moreover, there is a terminological issue with the new position, viz., it does not 
deserve the appellation ‘religious fictionalism.’ After all, it does not claim that religious 
discourse is a fiction. It rather claims that we do not know whether it is a fiction. Why would 
such a position be called “religious fictionalism”? As mentioned in Section 1, mathematical 
fictionalism and moral fictionalism assert, respectively, that mathematical discourse and 
moral discourse are fictions, so that mathematical and moral sentences are false. They do not 
assert that we do not know whether or not mathematical and moral discourses are fictions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Religious fictionalism asserts that religious sentences are false, and that religious 
practitioners merely accept religious sentences. By contrast, religious practicalism asserts that 
we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, but that religious practitioners 
believe religious sentences. Both religious fictionalism and practicalism assert that religious 
practitioners can justifiably carry on using religious sentences for practical purposes. Overall, 
religious practicalism has intellectual, moral, and practical advantages over religious 
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